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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
A company is regarded as an artificial being and is subject to limited rights and liabilities as 
opposed to natural persons.1 The precise nature of separate legal personality has been illustrated 
by many divergent theories.2 A corporation is regarded as having no physical existence hence 
it has no mind or will and exists only in terms of the law.3 With no physical existence or human 
attributes, a corporation has representatives to carry out its functions and duties and such 
representatives are treated as organic parts of the corporation with the thoughts and acts of such 
representatives regarded as that of the company.4 A logical consequence is that any faults of 
the representatives are regarded as being those of the company, in order to prevent the company 
escaping liability on the basis of separate legal personality.5  
 
However, the nature of companies are such that it is susceptible to being abused and 
manipulated by those who control it. Accordingly, the remedy of lifting of the corporate veil, 
is a consequence of disregarding the separate legal personality of a company which is a concept 
fundamental in company law.6 This concept was recognised in Salomon v Salomon & Co 
Ltd7(Salomon) where Lord Macnagthen emphasized that: ... “the company is at law a different 
person altogether from its subscribers”.8 Lord Halsbury clearly stated the importance attributed 
to the concept of separate corporate personality by saying that: 
 
“… if the company was a real thing which had a legal existence, and if consequently the law 
attributed to it certain rights and liabilities in its constitution as a company, it will follow as a 
consequence that it is impossible to deny the validity of the transactions into which it has 
entered”.9   
                                                           
1 M Pickering ‘The Company as a Separate Legal Entity’ (1968) 31(5) Modern Law Review 484. 
2 L Mthembu To Lift or Not to Lift the Corporate Veil- the Unfinished Story: A Critical Analysis of Common Law 
Principles in Lifting the Corporate Veil, unpublished LLM thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal (2002) 9-11. 
3 See Suttons Hospital 77 ER 937 960; 612 10 C Rep 1A 32 B which illustrates the fiction theory. 
4 See Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC (HL) 705.  
5 See Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC (HL) 705. 
6 See Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC (HL) 705. 
7 See Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. 
8 See Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 at 51. 
9 See Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 at 33. 
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South African as well as English courts have often rigidly applied this concept in order to keep 
the rule intact, which has at times resulted in undesirable results.10 Despite trying to honour the 
principle of separate legal personality established in the Salomon case, the courts have not 
tolerated abuse of this principle as can be seen in the case of United States v Milwaukee 
Refrigerator Transit11 where the court said that just as the court does not permit its process to 
be abused it should not permit the notion of legal entity to be used to justify wrongs, 
protect fraud or defend crime.12 Thus, the principle laid down in the Salomon case is not 
absolute13 and the court will in certain instances disregard the separate legal personality of a 
company and attach liability to where it truly lies to prevent  the infringement of the corporate 
veil.14 The instances giving rise to these consequences have been anything but certain which 
has often led to debates on how the remedy should be guided and interpreted. 
 
A glimpse at the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (herein after the ‘2008 Act’) clearly states that  
some of the purposes of the Act are to encourage transparency and high standards of corporate 
governance as well as to encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies.15 
It is therefore important to have in place a remedy to counter such abuse and mismanagement 
of the affairs. Thus, the rights flowing from the incorporation of a company is not without its 
limitations and can be curtailed to give effect to the purpose set out in s7 of the 2008 Act, such 
as the right to separate corporate personality. 
 
Prior to the enactment of the 2008 Act, the remedy was interpreted and applied using common 
law principles. Many attempts have been made to rationalise the common law principles to 
justify when a court will disregard separate legal personality, however no such breakthrough 
had been made.16 Foreign jurisdictions have however been a useful tool in aiding us make 
comparisons, by introducing improvement and development in the courts willingness to attach 
meaning to lifting the corporate veil.17 Notwithstanding this, our courts are still faced with 
                                                           
10 W A Joubert ‘The Law of South Africa’ (2012) 4(1) LAWSA at para 63. 
11 See United States v Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit 142 Fed 247 (1905). 
12 See United States v Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit 142 Fed 247 (1905) 255. 
13 J Bourne ‘Lifting the Corporate Veil’ (2002) 10 (3) Juta’s Business Law Journal 114. 
14 H Sher ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil’ (1996) 4 (2) Juta’s Business Law Journal 51. 
15 See section 7 (b)(iii) and (j) of Act 71 of 2008. 
16 W Zingoda Piercing the Corporate Veil in Terms of Gore: Section 20(9) of the New Companies Act 71 of 
2008, unpublished LLM thesis, University of Cape Town (2015) 6. 
17 See Ben Hashem v Al Shayif and Another [2008] EWHC 2380 (Fam) ([2009] 1 FLR 115; [2008] Fam Law 
1179).  
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issues surrounding the implementation of this remedy. This leads us to the question, as to what 
guidelines should be adduced from case law to assist in applying this remedy. 
 
1.2 Background 
Since the Salomon case the complete separation of a company has been recognised owing to 
the public being familiar with the consequences posed by limited liability companies.18 The 
instances in which the court will disregard the separate legal personality of a company have 
been divided between the common law and the current statutory approach. However neither of 
these approaches provides for a cohesive set of principles or guidelines that assist the court in 
reaching its decision. The courts have been very reluctant to depart from the Salomon principle.  
Bourne, in an attempt to set out the common law approach?, examines the exceptional cases 
under which the court will lift the corporate veil. He/she (not sure) argues that as it appears 
from case law, courts will not readily disregard separate legal personality however the courts 
have failed to define the precise situations under which they will do so.19 The courts have 
disregarded the separate legal personality where there has been fraud on the part of its 
shareholders, when it is in the public interest to lift the corporate veil and where it is fair to do 
so.20 The common law approach to lifting of the corporate veil is that the separate corporate 
personality must be strictly adhered to with the court having no carte blanch to simply disregard 
the separate legal personality of a company whenever it considers it just and convenient to do 
so.21 The case of Hulse-Reutter v Godde22(Hulse) clearly illustrated the uncertainty by saying: 
“The circumstances in which a court will disregard the distinction between a corporate entity 
and those who control it are far from settled”.23  
A dictum commonly referred to has been that of Gower’s, which states that the courts would 
lift the veil when the corporate entity is blatantly being used as a cloak for fraud or improper 
conduct.24 
                                                           
18 P Davis Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) 36. 
19 J Bourne ‘Lifting the Corporate Veil’ (2002) 10(3) Juta’s Business Law Journal 114. 
20 J Bourne ‘Lifting the Corporate Veil’ (2002) 10(3) Juta’s Business Law Journal 114. 
21 J Bourne ‘Lifting the Corporate Veil’ (2002) 10(3) Juta’s Business Law Journal 115. 
22 See Hulse-Reutter v Godde 2001 (4) SA 1336 (SCA). 
23 See Hulse-Reutter v Godde 2001 (4) SA 1336 (SCA) 1346. 
24 S Ottolengi ‘From Peeping behind the Corporate Veil to Ignoring it Completely’ (1990) 53 MLR 388. 
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In Bourne’s view, the court will seek to uphold the principle of separate legal personality and 
will probably only disregard the separate legal personality where there is presence of fraud or 
improper conduct, such as the misuse or abuse of the corporate structure by those under whose 
control it would be.25 Hulse displays the general attitude of the courts which shows that the 
courts are not easily convinced to disregard corporate personality and will only do so in rare 
circumstances.26 
Sher notes that courts have failed to formulate a coherent principle on which they could base 
their decisions to disregard separate legal personality and have instead chosen to rely on a 
number of separate unrelated categories of conduct to justify their decisions. However Cape 
Pacific v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd27(Cape Pacific) did not try to fit the facts 
into an existing category or create a new category instead they took an approach that the facts 
or each case should be considered when the need to pierce the corporate veil arise. 28 This 
seems to accord with our current law. 
 
In terms of foreign jurisdictions some countries are more developed than others when 
approaching this remedy, one such being the United States (US) where the motto of Sanborn J 
is often used, which states that when the corporate personality is used to defeat public 
convenience, justify wrong or protect fraud and defend crime then the law will regard the 
corporation as an association of persons.29 
 
What sparks our current debate is the statutory position on lifting the corporate veil. As far as 
case law and the legislature is concerned, there has been a failure to expressly state the meaning 
of the term ‘unconscionable abuse’ and the necessary prerequisites required for this remedy to 
be used. To be more guided in its application, there needs to be some set principles advanced 
to steer this process which could result in the prevention of mismanagement and abuse on 
behalf of those who control the company.  
 
 
 
                                                           
25 J Bourne ‘Lifting the Corporate Veil’ (2002) 10(3) Juta’s Business Law Journal 114. 
26 J Bourne ‘Lifting the Corporate Veil’ (2002) 10(3) Juta’s Business Law Journal 114. 
27 See Pacific v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd (Cape Pacific) 1994 (4) SA 790 (A). 
28 H Sher ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil’ (1996) 4(2) Juta’s Business Law Journal 51; 54. 
29 S Ottolenghi ‘From Peeping behind the Corporate Veil to Ignoring it Completely’ (1990) 53 MLR 339. 
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1.3 Aim 
The purpose of this dissertation is to first, ascertain the existing development of the principle 
of lifting of the corporate veil after the introduction of the s20(9) of the 2008 Act. Secondly, 
the thesis seeks to establish whether our courts have indeed made any progress regarding this 
principle, or has s20(9) increased the confusion of the application and interpretation of this 
principle. Thirdly, the principle of lifting of the corporate veil will be examined in light of 
foreign jurisdictions where appropriate and to what extent South African courts can adopt 
foreign court’s interpretation and application of the principle.  
 
Lastly, a conclusion will be drawn regarding whether South Africa should merely formulate 
guidelines that provide an open-ended, non-exhaustive list of instances for which the courts 
may pierce the corporate veil, where this could potentially result in our courts applying this 
remedy in a consistent and just manner that will give companies, directors, shareholders and 
members thereof clarity as to when certain acts could result in ‘unconscionable abuse’.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LEGAL PERSONALITY 
2.1 The concept of separate legal personality 
It is a well-established principle of South African company law that a company has separate 
legal personality, which means that the rights and duties enjoyed by a company are not shared 
by its members.30 Consequently, a company with limited liability is an independent legal 
person which is separate from its shareholders or directors.31 This point is evident in the 
following passage which was illustrated in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd32 
 
“…a limited company is more than a mere judicial entity, with a personality in law of its own: 
that there is room in company law for recognition of the fact that behind it, or amongst it, there 
are individuals, with rights, expectations and obligations inter se which are not necessarily 
submerged in the company structure”.33 
 
Hence, a company is capable of having legal rights and incurring legal obligations34 and such 
rights and obligations vest in the company and not its members.35 Moreover, the law determines 
what beings are accorded legal personality.36As such, it is important to take cognisance of the 
fact that, a company has no physical existence and exists only in the eyes of the law which 
means that a company acquires such legal personality when the Registrar of Companies issues 
it with a certificate of incorporation.37 
 
A case fundamental to this principle is the case of Salomon.38This case involved a situation 
where Salomon, a prosperous boot and shoe merchant was trading as a sole proprietor and 
decided to form a company in which he was the majority shareholder (he held 20 001 of 20 
007 shares) and his sons had one share each to which the court found was not contrary to the 
intention of the formation of a company in terms of the Companies Act 1862 and hence the 
                                                           
30 P Davis Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) 33. 
31 See Francis George Hill Family Trust v SA Reserve Bank 1992 2 All SA 137 (A); 1992 3 SA 91 (A) 97. 
32 See Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1972] 2 ALL ER 492. 
33 See Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1972] 2 ALL ER 500. 
34 P Davis Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) 36. 
35 P Davis Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) 77. 
36 P Davis Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) 73. 
37 See section 13(10) of Act 71 of 2008. 
38 See Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. 
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company was a separate legal person.39 To this end Lord Halsbury following the argument of 
Vaughan Williams J remarked:40 
 
“Either the limited company was a legal entity, or it was not. If it was, the business belongs to 
it and not to Mr. Salomon. If it was not, there was no person and no thing to be an agent at all; 
and it is impossible to say at the same time that there is a company and there is not”.41 
 
Gower remarks that this decision in the Salomon case created a new perspective in the world 
of commerce.42 Salomon by virtue of his debentures was a secured creditor of the company 
and upon insolvency his claim for repayment of his debentures would be paid in preference of 
ordinary trade creditors, which functioned as a mechanism to allow him to avoid any serious 
risk, while still acquiring the benefit of being the sole shareholder.43 Furthermore, there was 
found to be no fraud considering that all the shareholders knew what was going on and Salomon 
had not made a concealed profit. Had he done this the position would have been different.44 
Since this case, the complete separation of the company and its members have not been doubted 
and a partial justification for it is that the public deals with a limited liability company at their 
own risk and know or should know, what to expect.45 
 
South African courts have endorsed the principle laid down in the Salomon case as illustrated 
in the case of Dadoo.46 This case involved a situation where a company Dadoo Ltd was 
registered in the Transvaal with all its shares held by Asiatics. Statute prohibited Asiatics from 
owning immovable property in the Transvaal but was silent regarding companies controlled by 
Asiatics.47 The company bought land in the Transvaal and it was held that the company had 
not contravened the statute.48 It was held that a company is a separate legal entity from its 
shareholders and because property owned by a company does not belong to its members, the 
                                                           
39 See Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 at 23. 
40 See Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 at 31. 
41 See Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 550-551(Dadoo) where Innes CJ after 
quoting this passage with approval said ‘The result follows from separate legal personality which is given to 
corporations by statute and accepted in our practice. This position remains unaffected even in circumstances 
where a single member holds the controlling interest’. 
42 P Davis Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) 36. 
43 Davis Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) 35-36. 
44 See Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 at 22-23. 
45 P Davis Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) 36. 
46 See Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 550-551. 
47 See Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 540. 
48 See Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 556. 
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statutory provision was not contravened by the company even though the shares were held by 
Asian people.49 Innes CJ asserted that: 
 
“This conception of the existence of the company as a separate entity distinct from its founders 
is not merely an artificial technical thing. It is a matter of substance. Property vested in the 
company is not, and cannot be, regarded as vested in all or any of its members”.50 
 
The courts uphold this principle to such an extent that it finds application even in one-man 
companies. The case of Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd51 illustrates this point. This case concerned 
a situation where Lee carried on the business of aerial fertilization. He formed a company to 
take over his business and of 3000 shares he held 2999. He was the company’s only director 
and he was employed by the company as a salaried pilot. Whilst flying the aircraft on company 
business he crashed and was killed. His widow claimed compensation under the Workmen’s 
Compensation of New Zealand. The court stated to succeed in a claim she had to prove that 
Lee was both an employer and employee of the company, since it was a logical consequence 
from the Salomon decision that a person can function in a dual capacity then there was no 
reason why Lee could not have a contract of employment with the company, therefore his wife 
was entitled to claim for workmen’s compensation.52 
 
The importance attached to the principle of separate legal personality and the extent of its 
application has been clearly stated by our courts. The common law position was clearly 
emphasised in the case of Hulse53 where Scott JA held that the separate legal personality of a 
company is to be recognised and disregarded in very limited instances.54 The 2008 Act, has 
however widened this discretion and given courts discretionary power to invoke the remedy.55 
 
                                                           
49 See Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 556 where Solomon JA remarked … ‘it is 
impossible to hold that the property of a corporation really belongs to the individual shareholders’. Moreover, 
Solomon JA quoted with approval the case of Nation v Spratley (24 L.J. Ex. 53) where Baron Parke said ‘…the 
individual shareholders are quite distinct from the corporation: they are entitled to no direct interest in the land of 
the corporation: no part of the realty is held in trust for them.’ 
50 See Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 550. 
51 See Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd [1961] AC 12 (PC). 
52 See Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd [1961] AC 12 (PC) 426. See also Inland Revenue Commissioners v Sansom 
[1921] 2 KB 516 where the court looked at the fact that the deceased and company were separate legal entities so 
as to permit contractual obligations. 
53 See Hulse-Reutter v Godde 2001 (4) SA 1336 (SCA). 
54 See Hulse-Reutter v Godde 2001 (4) SA 1336 (SCA) 1346. 
55 See section 20(9) of Act 71 of 2008. 
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It is therefore trite law in South Africa that once a company is incorporated it has a separate 
existence from its members56 and such separate existence is to be upheld, unless common law 
or statute provide otherwise.57 Moreover the abuse of separate legal personality is not tolerated 
by the courts just to uphold this principle as can be seen by case law. Accordingly, companies 
should take precaution to prevent abuse of separate legal personality. 
 
2.2 The nature of separate legal personality 
Many terms have been used to describe the concept of separate legal personality. First, a veil, 
mask or curtain between the members of the company and outsiders, which is lifted when the 
law goes behind the corporate personality to the individual members.58 Secondly, a veil 
between the company and its members and thirdly, one economic entity divided by a corporate 
veil or several economic realities that may be joined.59 This is important as the fundamental 
question which relates to separate legal personality is who will be liable for the wrongs or 
crimes committed by the company since the rights and obligations belong to the company, even 
though they lack physical attributes of human beings. 
 
A company is a juristic person, also called a fictitious or artificial person.60 Hence legal 
personality is not a natural phenomenon but a creature of law.61 Companies differ from any 
natural person in that they only acquire restricted rights and liabilities than natural persons. 
Accordingly, company law first requires companies to state their objects on incorporation, thus 
restricting its capacity and secondly common law imposes limitations on corporate capacity.62  
 
There have been several theories used to describe the nature of separate legal personality of 
which many have been criticised or rejected based on their logic and practicality63, namely the 
fiction, organic and concession theory.64 The two rival theories which have received the most 
attention has been the fiction and organic theory.65  
                                                           
56 See Francis George Hill Family Trust v SA Reserve Bank 1992 2 All SA 137 (A); 1992 3 SA 91 (A) 97. 
57 J Bourne ‘Lifting the Corporate Veil’ (2002) 10(3) Juta’s Business Law Journal 114.  
58 M Pickering ‘The Company as a Separate Legal Entity’ (1968) 31(5) Modern Law Review 488. 
59 M Pickering ‘The Company as a Separate Legal Entity’ (1968) 31(5) Modern Law Review 484. 
60 M Pickering ‘The Company as a Separate Legal Entity’ (1968) 31(5) Modern Law Review 481. 
61 See Darthmouth College v Woodward 17 US 629 659; 4 Wheat 518 (1819) 636. 
62 M Pickering ‘The Company as a Separate Legal Entity’ (1968) 31(5) Modern Law Review 484. 
63 L Mthembu op cit note 2.  . 
64 WA Joubert ‘The Law of South Africa’ (2012) 4(1) LAWSA 64. 
65 Ibid at 63. 
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In terms of the fiction theory only human beings can be the subjects of rights and legal 
personality can only be attributed to natural persons.66 This theory further states that a 
corporation is capable of having rights and duties although it has no physical existence, hence 
it has no mind or will and cannot act itself.67 It must be represented by human beings and 
although it cannot commit wrongs or crimes, it can be vicariously liable for wrongs of its 
representatives which attempts to guarantee individual moral autonomy.68 The theory that a 
corporation has no physical existence seems always to have been accepted by the courts see 
the case of Suttons Hospital69 where Coke CJ said that the corporation is an abstraction and 
exists only in terms of the law.70 
 
In terms of the organic theory, it provides that in certain circumstances the thoughts and acts 
of a particular person (usually a director of a company) are regarded in law as the thoughts and 
acts of the company itself.71 Consequently, the intention and negligence (fault) of the person is 
regarded as that of the company to prevent the company from escaping liability.72 Thus, the 
persons whose thoughts and acts are regarded as the thoughts and acts of the company itself 
are treated as organic parts of the company.73The organic theory was first articulated by the 
courts in the case of Lennard’s74 where Viscount Haldane said that a corporation is an 
abstraction, it has no mind, body or will of its own, its active and directing will must be sought 
by someone who is the agent, but who is really the directing will of the corporation.75 This case 
concerned a situation where the ship and the cargo were lost due to unseaworthiness, in terms 
of the relevant Act the company was to be liable for loss if it was at fault and hence the directing 
mind of the ship was held to be the directing mind of the company.76The courts in the republic 
                                                           
66 WA Joubert ‘The Law of South Africa’ (2012) 4(1) LAWSA 64. 
67 WA Joubert ‘The Law of South Africa’ (2012) 4(1) LAWSA 64. 
68 WA Joubert ‘The Law of South Africa’ (2012) 4(1) LAWSA 64. 
69 See Suttons Hospital 77 ER 937 960; 612 10 C Rep 1A 32 B. 
70 See also Darthmouth College v Woodward 17 US 629 659; 4 Wheat 518 (1819) at 636 where Marshall CJ said 
that a corporation is an artificial being which is intangible and exists only in the contemplation of law. 
71 WA Joubert ‘The Law of South Africa’ (2012) 4(1) LAWSA 64. 
72 WA Joubert ‘The Law of South Africa’ (2012) 4(1) LAWSA 64. 
73 See Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC (HL) 705. 
74 See Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC (HL) 705. 
75 See also Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. (G.B) Ltd v Daimler Co [1915] K.B 893 at 916 (Daimler) where the 
court looked at the attributes of a corporation and where Buckley L.J said that the corporation has no physical 
existence and exists only in the eyes of the law. It has no body, parts nor passions. It cannot wear weapons or 
serve in wars. It cannot be loyal or disloyal. It cannot commit treason. It can neither be a friend nor enemy. It 
cannot have thoughts apart from its incorporators, nor intentions or mind other than minds of its incorporators. 
76 See Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC (HL) 606. 
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have recognised the organic theory. In Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Richmond Estates 
(Pty) Ltd 77Centlivres said that: 
 
“A company is an artificial person with no body to kick and no soul to damn and the only way 
of ascertaining its intention is to find out what its directors acting as such intended. Their formal 
acts in the form of resolutions [passed by a board of directors] constitute evidence as to the 
intentions of the company of which they are directors but where a company has only one 
director… it is perhaps not going too far to say that his mind is also the mind of the company”. 
 
With regards to the concession theory it holds that corporations are legal fictions that are 
created by law and that corporations are the creation of the state.78 The common law has 
accepted the concession theory as can be seen in the case of Tripling v Pexall 79where Coke CJ 
said that corporations have no soul and cannot be subpoenaed, a corporation is a body aggregate 
and only God can create souls, but the king creates them, nor can they appear in person, but by 
attorney.80 
 
It is therefore submitted that the best theory to be the organic theory. This is not because it is 
the most used theory but since it is a logical consequence flowing from the fact that a 
corporation does not have the attributes of a human being and needs representatives to carry 
out the functions of such corporation. Thus, in a case where such person is negligent it should 
be regarded as the negligence of the company to prevent companies from escaping liability 
based on separate legal personality as well as attaching consequences to the rights and 
obligations endowed on a company based on acquiring separate legal personality. Therefore, 
if the rights and obligations belong to a company so must the wrongs and crimes to prevent the 
abuse of separate corporate personality. 
 
2.3 Exceptions to separate legal personality 
Our courts have tried to preserve the inviolability of the corporate veil.81Charlesworth however 
notes that:  
                                                           
77 See Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Richmond Estates (Pty) Ltd 1956 1 SA 602 (A). 
78 WA Joubert ‘The Law of South Africa’ (2012) 4(1) LAWSA 64. 
79 See Tripling v Pexall (1614) 80 ER 1085. 
80 WA Joubert ‘The Law of South Africa’ (2012) 4(1) LAWSA 64. 
81 H Sher ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil’ (1996) 4(2) Juta’s Business Law Journal 51. 
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“There are exceptions to the principle in Salomon's case, where the veil is lifted, and the law 
disregards the corporate entity and pays regard instead to the economic realities behind the legal 
facade. In these exceptional cases, the law either goes behind the corporate personality to the 
individual members or ignores the separate personality of each company in favour of the 
economic entity constituted by a group of associated concerns”.82 
 
The rule laid down in Salomon83 establishes firstly that: 
 
 1. If a company is validly incorporated, all formalities are complied with even if it is a one-
man company;84  
2. Secondly, the courts will be reluctant to treat each shareholder as being personally liable for 
the debts of the company by piercing the corporate veil.85  
 
The court went on to say that the company is not an agent of its members, nor are the members 
liable in any shape or form except to the extent provided by the Act.86 This general rule is 
however, not without its exceptions and the court may disregard the separate corporate 
personality of a corporation in certain instances.87 Common law and statute acknowledge that 
the separate corporate personality of a company may be abused and make exceptions to the 
concept of separate corporate personality.88 There are no set category of instances in which a 
court will disregard the separate legal personality, there are merely instances in which the court 
will disregard separate legal personality.89  
 
                                                           
82 G Morse, S Girvin, Charlesworth Company Law 13ed (1987) 27. See also S Ottolenghi ‘From Peeping behind 
the Corporate Veil to Ignoring it completely’ (1990) 53 MLR 353. 
83 See Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. 
84 See Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd [1961] AC 12 (PC). 
85 P Davis Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) 35. In other words, to disregard the separate legal 
personality of a company. 
86 See Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 at 51. However, see also M Pickering ‘The Company as a 
Separate Legal Entity’ (1968) 31(5) Modern Law Review at 490 where Pickering took an opposing view and said 
that when a company owns or deals in property, or enters into services, sale or other contracts it does not in its 
own right, as a natural person may do, but merely for or on behalf of its members and for their benefit. Thus, a 
company is an agent of its members, or as a trustee for them, of property and contractual rights and obligations 
which in a true sense, taking into account, the realities of the situation belong to those members. 
87 J Bourne ‘Lifting the Corporate Veil’ (2002) 10(3) Juta’s Business Law Journal 114. 
88 F Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 42. 
89 F Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 43. 
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Undoubtedly the common law approach was restrictive in its application and implementation 
of disregarding a company’s separate legal personality as can be seen in Hulse90 in order to 
preserve the concept of separate legal personality as articulated in the case of Salomon.91 
Section 20(9) of the 2008 Act however, has relaxed the requirements for the application of this 
remedy. However, this section has not been without its challenges and unanswered questions.92 
Thus, our courts still have some work to do in clearing up the confusion that attaches to the 
exceptions under which separate corporate personality will be disregarded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
90 See Hulse-Reutter v Godde 2001 (4) SA 1336 (SCA) 1346. 
91 See Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. 
92 Examples of such questions include what is the definition of ‘unconscionable abuse’ laid down in section 
20(9) of the 2008 Act? 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE BENEFIT OF FORMATION AND INCORPORATION OF A COMPANY 
3.1 The incorporation of a company 
It is important to note that a company does not exist as a legal entity until it is incorporated.93 
Thus, a company becomes a juristic person from the time and date that it is registered.94 
Consequently, prior to the incorporation of a company a representative must act on behalf of 
the company.95 The formalities of incorporation must be adhered to; professionals must be 
instructed and paid to prepare the necessary incorporation documents, namely; the 
memorandum of incorporation and the notice of incorporation.96 In terms of a company’s 
memorandum of incorporation it may be in a standard form or in a unique form specific to the 
company, as such it may deal with any issue not addressed in the 2008 Act and may alter any 
alterable provision.97 The memorandum of incorporation must be consistent with the 2008 Act 
and is void to the extent that it contravenes or is inconsistent with the said Act.98 Furthermore, 
the business proposal needs to be appraised and initial finances must be raised.99 
 
The incorporation of a company is the legal beginning of a company that will ultimately lead 
to the company acquiring certain rights and duties and incurring certain liabilities. Section 13 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 sets out the process and procedure to be followed in order to 
incorporate a company. This section provides that one or more persons or a juristic person may 
incorporate a profit company, or three or more persons may incorporate a non-profit 
company.100 This is done by completing and each signing in person or by proxy a memorandum 
of incorporation, in the prescribed manner and form unique to the company101 and filing a 
                                                           
93 A Nwafor ‘Company Promoters and the Enforcement of Pre-Incorporation Contracts’ (2010) 22 SAMJ 66; see 
also s19(1)(a) of Act 71 of 2008 
94 P Delport, Q Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 1973 (2011) at 121. 
95 A Nwafor ‘Company Promoters and the Enforcement of Pre-Incorporation Contracts’ (2010) 22 SAMJ 66. 
96 A Nwafor ‘Company Promoters and the Enforcement of Pre-Incorporation Contracts’’ (2010) 22 SAMJ 66; see 
see also s14(1) – (2) of Act 71 of 2008. The incorporation of a company is the legal beginning of a company that 
will ultimately lead to the company acquiring certain rights and duties and incurring certain liabilities. Section 13 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 sets out the process and procedure to be followed in order to incorporate a 
company. This section provides that one or more persons or a juristic person may incorporate a profit company, 
or three or more persons may incorporate a non-profit company.96 This is done by completing and each signing 
in person or by proxy a memorandum of incorporation, in the prescribed manner and form unique to the company96 
and filing a notice of incorporation in the prescribed manner and form, together with a prescribed fee and 
accompanied by a copy of the memorandum of incorporation. 
97 P Delport, Q Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 61 of 2008 (2017) at 71. 
98 P Delport, Q Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 61 of 2008 (2017) at 71; see also s15(1)(a) - (b)* of 
Act 71 of 2008.  
99 A Nwafor ‘Company Promoters and the Enforcement of Pre-Incorporation Contracts’’ (2010) 22 SAMJ 66. 
100 See section 13(1) of Act 71 of 2008. 
101 See sections 13(a) (i) - (ii) of Act 71 of 2008. 
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notice of incorporation in the prescribed manner and form, together with a prescribed fee and 
accompanied by a copy of the memorandum of incorporation.102 If the memorandum of 
incorporation includes any provision contemplated in s15(2),103 the notice of incorporation 
filed must include a prominent statement drawing attention to each such provision, and its 
location in the memorandum of incorporation.104 The commission may reject the notice of 
incorporation if the notice or anything to be filed with it is incomplete or improperly incomplete 
in any respect105 and must reject the notice of incorporation if the initial directors of the 
company as set out in the notice are fewer than required,106 or if the commission reasonably 
believes that any of the initial directors are disqualified and the remaining directors are fewer 
than required.107 
Thereafter as soon as practicable after accepting a notice of incorporation in terms of section 
13(1) the Commission must assign to the company a unique registration number;108 and enter 
the prescribed information concerning the company in the companies register;109 endorse the 
notice of incorporation and, if applicable, the copy of the memorandum of incorporation filed 
with it, in the prescribed manner;110 and issue and deliver to the company a registration 
certificate in the prescribed manner and form, dated as of the later of-  the date on, and time at, 
which the Commission issued the certificate;111 or  the date, if any, stated by the incorporators 
in the notice of incorporation.112 A registration certificate is conclusive evidence that all 
requirements of incorporation of a company have been complied with and the company is 
incorporated under this Act from the date and time if any has been stated in the certificate.113 
 
                                                           
102 See sections 13(2) (a) - (b) of Act 71 2008. 
103 Section 15(2) of Act 71 of 2008 Act states that the Memorandum of Incorporation of any company may-  
(a) include any provision- (i) dealing with a matter that this Act does not address; (ii) altering the effect of any 
alterable provision of this Act; or (iii) imposing on the company a higher standard, greater restriction, longer 
period of time or any similarly more onerous requirement, than would otherwise apply to the company in terms 
of an unalterable provision of this Act; (b) contain any restrictive conditions applicable to the company, and any 
requirement for the amendment of any such condition in addition to the requirements set out in section 16; (c) 
prohibit the amendment of any particular provision of the Memorandum of Incorporation; or (d) not include any 
provision that negates, restricts, limits, qualifies, extends or otherwise alters the substance or effect of an 
unalterable provision of this Act except to the extent contemplated in paragraph (a)(iii). 
104 See section 13(3) of Act 71 of 2008. 
105 See section 13(4) (a) of Act 71 of 2008. 
106 See section 13(4) (b) (i) of Act 71 of 2008. 
107 See section 13(4) (b) (ii) of Act 71 of 2008. 
108 See section 14(1) (a) of Act 71 of 2008. 
109 See section 14(b) (i) of Act 71 of 2008. 
110 See section 14(b) (ii) of Act 71 of 2008. 
111 See section 14(b) (ii) (aa) of Act 71 of 2008. 
112 See section 14(b) (iii) (bb) of Act 71 of 2008. 
113 See sections 14(4) (a)-(b) of At 71 of 2008. 
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The process and procedure of incorporation of a company depicted in s13 and s14 above, has 
certain consequences and benefits attached to it that encourages the formation of companies to 
enable persons to derive such benefits. As such the formation of companies are important as it 
facilitates access to capital which brings about commercial enterprise and the growth and 
development of the economy.114 Moreover, the formation of a company is a right and not a 
privilege that is given by the state,115 and can be seen as the exercise of a person’s constitutional 
right to freedom of association and freedom to contract.116 
 
3.2 The effect of incorporation 
The incorporation of a company gives rise to various rights that enable the company to among 
other things; sue and be sued, exist after the death or transfer of shares of a member, to own 
property and assets and to receive profits. The effect of incorporation of a company is that the 
subscribers and members of a company shall be deemed to be a corporation with a name 
ascribed to the company in its memorandum of incorporation and be capable of exercising all 
the functions and enjoying all the rights of an incorporated company with the consequence of 
being liable for debts of the company at the winding up of a company, to the extent provided 
for in the memorandum of incorporation.117 Therefore, a company will be have all the powers 
of an individual, to the extent that it is capable of exercising such powers, example: entering 
into a marriage.118 
 
3.2.1 A company can sue or be sued in its own name 
At common law a corporation is an association of individuals that is capable of holding 
property and can sue or be sued in its own corporate name, it may enforce its own rights; and 
liabilities are enforced directly against the company.119 In Foss v Harbottle120 and Mozley v 
Alston121 it was established that: 
“ …the proper plaintiff in an action in respect of a wrong alleged to be done to a company or 
association of persons is prima facie the company or association ...” 
 
                                                           
114 F Cassim ‘The Companies Act 2008: An Overview of a Few of its Core Provisions’ (2010) 22(2) SAMJ 159. 
115 F Cassim ‘The Companies Act 2008: An Overview of a Few of its Core Provisions’ (2010) 22(2) SAMJ 159. 
116 F Cassim ‘The Companies Act 2008: An Overview of a Few of its Core Provisions’ (2010) 22(2) SAMJ 159. 
117 P Delport and Q Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 1973 (2011) at 123. 
118 P Delport and Q Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 1973 (2011) at 73. 
119 WA Joubert ‘The Law of South Africa’ (2012) 4(1) LAWSA 76. 
120 See Foss v Harbottle 1843 2 Ha. 461. 
121 See Mozley v Alston 1847 1 Ph 790. 
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This case created legal standing for a company to be a party to an action either for or against 
it, enabling a company to assert and enforce the rights given to it by virtue of incorporation of 
the company and separate legal personality. This illustrates the advantage of forming a 
company and the protection and power incidental to such formation. 
  
The exception to the general rule laid down in the cases above is found in terms of a derivative 
action in English law where the wrong complained of involves either fraudulent conduct or is 
ultra vires; or the wrong has been perpetrated by directors and shareholders who constitute a 
majority and therefore control the company.122 Lord Denning gave a detailed explanation of 
this exception in Moir v Wallersteiner and Others 123 where he described the situation as 
follows: 
 
“If it is defrauded by a wrongdoer, the company itself is the one person to sue for the damage. 
Such is the rule in Foss v Harbottle. The rule is easy enough to apply when the company is 
defrauded by outsiders. The company itself is the only person who can sue. Likewise, when it 
is defrauded by insiders of a minor kind, once again the company is the only person who can 
sue. But suppose it is defrauded by insiders who control its affairs by directors who hold a 
majority of shares who can then sue for damages? Those directors are themselves the 
wrongdoers. If a board meeting is held, they will not authorise proceedings to be taken by the 
company against themselves. If a general meeting is called, they will vote down any suggestion 
that the company should sue them themselves. Yet the company is the one person who is 
damnified. In one way or another some means must be found for the company to sue. Otherwise 
the law would fail in its purpose. Injustice would be done without redress”. 
 
This reasoning is no detraction from the purpose of a company and the functions and powers 
given to a duly incorporated company. The mechanism that is endowed on a company, which 
is the ability to sue and be sued in their own name is important and, in the scenario, as 
demonstrated by Lord Denning it will prevent the abuse by directors who commit wrongs 
against the company in the hope that the company will have no right or capability to sue and 
enforce the appropriate legal action against them. Therefore, a company must act and be acted 
against to enforce its rights and obligations.124 Consequently, a shareholder will not have a 
                                                           
122 See Francis George Hill Family Trust v SA Reserve Bank 1992 2 All SA 137 (A); 1992 3 SA 91 (A) 97 at 
140. 
123 See Moir v Wallersteiner and Others (1975) 1 All ER 849 (CA) 857 D-F. 
124 M Pickering ‘The Company as a Separate Legal Entity’ (1968) 31(5) Modern Law Review 501. 
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right of action for a loss sustained by a company even though the loss may reduce a 
shareholders value in shares, the principle still holds that the company must itself institute 
action and is capable of doing so in its own name.125 This has always been accepted as a 
fundamental characteristic of corporate personality.126 Thus, once a corporation is duly 
incorporated, all other incidents are tacitly connected, one of which is to sue and be sued and 
to prosecute and be prosecuted.127 
 
3.2.2 A company has perpetual succession 
Perpetual succession depends on whether the company in question will continue to exist even 
after the individual members have left or have died.128 The significance of perpetual succession 
is when a member of a company dies or transfers their shares to another company; the existence 
of the company is neither changed nor affected at all.129 As such the death of a member or 
change in membership will leave the company unmoved, with the result that members may 
come and go and the company will continue to live on forever.130 Hence, death or transfer of 
shares merely terminates the deceased’s or the transferor’s membership, and the person on 
whom the shares devolve, or the transferee, becomes a member of the company in the former 
member’s place.131 As recognised, where there is a change in shareholding and control of a 
company, the existence and identity of the company remains unchanged.132 The importance of 
this attribute has often been expressed by our courts, an example of this is where Marshall CJ 
said:133 
“Being a mere creature of law, a corporation possesses only those properties which the charter 
of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence… among 
the most important are immortality...” 
What is apparent about such a characteristic is the convenience of not having to dissolve the 
company each time there is death or change in membership of the company, allowing the 
company to carry out its functions and responsibilities without having to concern itself with 
                                                           
125 F Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 42. 
126 WA Joubert ‘The Law of South Africa’ (2012) 4(1) LAWSA 76. 
127 See Suttons Hospital 77 ER 937 960; 612 10 C Rep 1A 32 B. 
128 See Malebjoe v Bantu Methodist Church of SA 1957 4 ALL SA 90(W); 1957 45 A 465 (W) 466 as per Kuper 
J. 
129 WA Joubert ‘The Law of South Africa’ (2012) 4(1) LAWSA 66. 
130 P Davis Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) 42. 
131 WA Joubert ‘The Law of South Africa’ (2012) 4(1) LAWSA 66. 
132 See Stern v Vesta Industries (Pty) Ltd 1976, 1 ALL SA 198 (W); 1976 1 SA 81 (W) 85 as per Colman J. 
133 See Darthmouth College v Woodward 17 US 629 659; 4 Wheat 518 (1819) 636. 
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when the company might dissolve due to death or transfer of any of its members.134 In my view 
this a very practical and useful feature of a company that avoids unnecessary delay and expense 
in continuing business activities. 
 
3.2.3 The profits, property and assets of a company belong to the company 
The profits of a company belong to the company and not its shareholders or even sole 
shareholder.135 What the shareholders do however have, is a right to profits when the company 
declares a dividend.136 The advantage of incorporation is that it allows the property of a 
company to be clearly separated, distinguished and identified from that of its members.137 
Accordingly, the claims of the company creditors will lie against the property of the company 
and claims of members’ personal creditors will lie against the personal property of the creditor, 
which in turn prevents competition amongst creditors.138 Thus, the property and assets of a 
company, belong to the company and not the shareholders, but the shareholders have a right to 
the residue after the creditors have been paid. This is the shareholders financial interest in the 
dividends paid by the company.139 This interest was clearly stated in the case of Stellenbosch 
Farmer’s Winery v Distillers Corporation Ltd and Another140 where the court said: 
“The fact that the shareholder is entitled to an aliquot share in the distribution of the surplus 
assets when the company is wound up proves that he is financially interested in the success or 
failure of the company but not that he has any right or title to any assets of the company”. 
 
It is evident that incorporation creates a separation between the property, profits and assets of 
the company and that of the shareholders to the extent that there is a difference between a 
pecuniary interest of a shareholder and an actual right to the property owned by the company.141 
Thus a shareholder will have no right to any piece of property belonging to a company.142 This 
distinction definitely accords with the very nature of separate legal personality, that a company 
                                                           
134 WA Joubert ‘The Law of South Africa’ (2012) 4(1) LAWSA 66. 
135 F Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 38. 
136 F Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 38. 
137 P Davis Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) 41; see also Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd 
[1925] AC 619 (HL) and Lorcom Thirteen (Pty) Ltd v Zurich Insurance Company South Africa Ltd 2013 (5) SA 
42 (WCC). 
138 P Davis Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) 42. 
139 F Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 36. 
140 Stellenbosch Farmer’s Winery v Distillers Corporation Ltd and Another 1962(1) SA 485 (A) 472A. 
141 See Francis George Hill Family Trust v SA Reserve Bank 1992 2 All SA 137 (A); 1992 3 SA 91 (A) 97 at 
147. 
142 See Francis George Hill Family Trust v SA Reserve Bank 1992 2 All SA 137 (A); 1992 3 SA 91 (A) 97 at 
147. 
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is capable of acquiring property in its own name and receiving profits which accrues to the 
company itself. The effect of this attribute is that it undoubtedly respects, recognises and 
upholds the division of a company and its members. 
 
3.3 A company as a distinct legal person 
Once a corporation becomes duly registered it is recognised as a distinct legal person, which is 
a separate legal entity either individually or in terms of a body corporate.143 In Gas Lighting 
Improvements Co Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioner144 Lord Sumner in emphasizing the 
company’s separate existence said:  
“‘Between the investor, who participates as a shareholder, and the undertaking carried on, the law 
interposes another person, real though artificial, the company itself, and the business carried on is the 
business of that company, and the capital employed is its capital and not in either case the business or 
capital of the shareholders”. 
This is a clear illustration that the property and affairs of the company are to be kept distinct 
with no overlap between the company and its shareholders. It is therefore submitted that this 
asserts the notion that a company, as provided by law, is a separate legal person and as such 
anything acquired by a company, belongs to the company and should not be muddled as 
belonging to the shareholders. In terms of the word ‘person’ it is used in the context to describe 
a human being, and in the legal sense any entity capable of acquiring rights and duties shall be 
considered a ‘person’.145 However, a juristic person such as a company is not defined in the 
2008 Act, but despite there being no definition, it is advanced that a company is clearly a juristic 
person in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the word.146  
The concept of a company being a separate or distinct legal person is important as it determines 
to what extent a company is treated as a natural person with the attributes and rights of a natural 
person being almost the same for a company. That being said, being a fiction of law makes it 
impossible for a company to engage in certain activities or to be endowed with all the rights 
given to a natural person.147 One of the first evident differences between a natural and a juristic 
person, is that a juristic person being a legal conception cannot be physically present 
                                                           
143 P Delport, Q Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 1973 (2011) 121. 
144 See Gas Lighting Improvements Co Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioner 1923 AC 723 (HL) 740. 
145 J Gibson et al South African Mercantile and Company Law 8ed (2003) 259. See also Nathan’s Estate v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1948 (3) SA 866 (N) 882. 
146 P Delport, Q Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 1973 (2011) 83. 
147 P Delport, Q Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 1973 (2011) 83. 
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anywhere.148 Another distinction is that a juristic person cannot be appointed as a guardian of 
a minor as the relationship between the minor and guardian is a personal one requiring personal 
contact and a human relationship.149 On the more advantageous side a juristic person shares 
many similarities to a natural person regarding the rights that it possesses, namely; the right to 
privacy and the right to identity and if these rights are unlawfully infringed the court will protect 
against it.150 Further, the company may sue for defamation that injures its reputation,151 claim 
damages for actual loss as a result of defamation,152  has the right to equality in terms of s9(1) 
of the Constitution153 and should not be treated differently compared to a natural person with  
the result that a company can be discriminated against on the basis of race.154 Section 8(4) of 
the Constitution therefore states that a juristic person is entitled to the same rights endowed on 
a natural person to the extent that it can exercised by such juristic person.155 Section 8(4) of the 
Constitution states that: 
“A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the 
nature of the rights and the nature of the juristic person”. 
A company being recognised as a person in the eyes of the law attracts many valuable attributes 
and rights that essentially serves as a form of protection towards the company, preventing 
outsiders from abusing and infringing the rights endowed on a company. Although there is a 
limitation regarding the rights that a company can exercise or the activities that a company is 
permitted to engage in, in my view these limitations are justified as practically, a company 
cannot carry out certain functions such as those requiring physical participation, for example 
having a human relationship as described above.156 
 
3.4 The concept of limited liability 
To understand the purpose and function of limited liability, it is important to first take 
cognisance of the rationale underlying the concept of limited liability. The rationale being that 
                                                           
148 See Madrassa Anjuman Islamia v Johannesburg Municipal Council 1919 AD 439; 449. 
149 F Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 31. See Ex Parte Donaldson 1947 (3) SA 170 (T) 
173. 
150 See Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451 (A) 461-463. 
151 See Dhlomo NO v Natal Newspapers (Pty) Ltd 1989 (1) SA 945 (A) 948-953. 
152 See Caxton Ltd v Reeva Forman (Pty) Ltd 1990 (3) SA 547 (A) 560. 
153 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
154 See Manang & Associates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2009 (1) SA 644 (EqC). 
155 F Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 32. 
156 See Ex Parte Donaldson 1947 (3) SA 170 (T) 173. 
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limited liability is to encourage the economic expansion and access to capital and investment, 
without excluding less affluent investors from participating in the business market as was 
previously the case.157 The vital question to be asked regarding a shareholder’s contribution is, 
to what extent will a shareholder suffer a loss or incur a liability should the company go 
insolvent? As such one of the benefits that a company provides shareholders with, is the 
protection of limited liability.158 This protection given to shareholder and directors is confirmed 
in legislation in terms s19(2)159 and provides the following: 
“A person is not, solely by reason of being an incorporator, shareholder or director of a 
company, liable for any liabilities or obligations of the company, except to the extent that this 
Act or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise”. 
This essentially means that the liability of shareholders for the company’s debts will be limited 
to the amount that they have paid or agreed to pay the company for its shares, and this amounts 
to their contribution.160 Therefore, limited liability is now available to all members of a 
company regardless of their participation in management to the extent that the court can in 
certain instances lift the corporate veil.161 So, should the company go insolvent, being the 
worst-case scenario, the loss that a shareholder will have to bare will be the entire value of their 
contribution or investment.162 What will be protected during this process is a shareholder’s 
personal assets such as their home, pension funds and domestic goods.163 If there is a residual 
that remains after the payment of creditors, shareholders will stand to benefit from such 
residual.164 
The loss that one has to succumb to or the liability they will incur in any business venture is 
always a fundamental consideration and ultimately a key factor, when deciding whether to 
make an investment in return for shares in a company. The protection of limited liability serves 
to create a safeguard to the extent of loss or liability. This in my opinion ensures that investors 
                                                           
157 E Fox ‘Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies’ (1994) 62 George Washington Law Review 1154. 
158 P Davis Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) 193. 
159 Act 71 of 2008. 
160 P Davis Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) 193. See also W Kluwer The Limited Liability 
Handbook (2012) at 14 where it was recognised that the risk of loss is limited to the amount of capital invested in 
the business with the effect of protecting personal assets of shareholder, which will not be used to satisfy debts 
and obligations.  
161 E Fox ‘Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies’ (1994) 62 George Washington Law Review 1148. 
162 P Davis Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) 193. See also W Kluwer The Limited Liability 
Handbook (2012) at 14 where it was noted that there is an exception to this general rule, which allows the court 
to lift the corporate veil if a member disregards separate legal personality of a company to commit wrongs and 
injustices against the company. 
163 P Davis Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) 193. 
164 P Davis Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) 194. 
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are not easily deterred when investing their money in a specific company. Moreover, limited 
liability is now available to all investors and not just affluent investors165 which may entice 
more people to invest their monies given the lower risk attached to them losing their personal 
assets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
165 E Fox ‘Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies’ (1994) 62 George Washington Law Review 1154. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LIFTING THE CORPORATE VEIL 
4.1 The concept of lifting of the corporate veil 
The term ‘lifting the veil’ has often been described as a metaphor,166 and has been derived from 
the usage in the United States.167 There exist many different types of  veil piercing; namely, 
legal veil piercing where a statute requires that the liability of the company to be imposed on 
shareholders or directors,168 judicial veil piercing where the courts find that a dominating 
person behind the company is liable for company debts with no mandate provided by statute,169 
voluntary veil piercing where a third party agrees to be liable for the debts of the company and 
reverse piercing involves a situation whereby the court orders a third party to return an asset to 
the company against which a claim  is made.170  
The focus in this chapter will therefore mainly be directed at, but not restricted to, the former 
two types. According to Blackman, piercing the veil often takes two forms or has two results, 
first, where the court disregards the company and treats the members as if they have been acting 
in partnership with the consequence that they will be liable for the debts and liabilities incurred 
by the company, which is noted as a common consequence and second, where liabilities 
incurred in a shareholder’s personal capacity is treated as if it were incurred by the company.171  
It is acknowledged that the use of metaphors to describe a set of legal procedures is uncommon, 
inaccurate and carries with it certain dangers.172 Cassim supports this view by stating that 
avoiding the use of metaphors can create certainty and prevent confusion.173  The meaning of 
                                                           
166 A Dbe ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil-Old Metaphor, Modern Practice?’ (2017) 3(1) Journal of Corporate and 
Commercial Law and Practice 1 where it was pointed out that lifting the corporate veil is indeed a metaphor. See 
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this phrase ‘lifting the veil’ and more accurately this procedure, can be said to describe a 
situation where a court disregards the separate legal personality of a company and attaches 
liability to where it truly lies, notwithstanding that the same person is not usually liable 
regarding such wrong a company has committed but will be liable in respect of that wrong.174 
Therefore, in terms of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil it is premised on the notion 
that strict adherence to shareholder limited liability, would result in unjust results, with one 
such result being that the court disregards limited liability and imposes liability for corporate 
debts on the shareholders.175 In Cape Pacific,176 the court defined the term ‘lifting the corporate 
veil’ to mean a scenario of disregarding the distinction between a corporation and the natural 
persons who govern the activities and attaching liability to the person who has abused or 
misused the principle of distinct legal personality.177 
This doctrine can be seen as the exception to the general principle of separate legal personality 
that will be invoked when this protection is abused. Danckwerts LJ in an attempt to sum up the 
position of disregarding the corporate veil emphasized:178 
“…where the character of a company, or the nature of the persons who control it, is a 
relevant feature the court will go behind the mere status of the company as a legal entity 
and will consider who are the persons as shareholders or even as agents who direct and 
control the activities of a company which is incapable of doing anything without human 
assistance”. 
 
As shown by Hannigan one of the clearest statements of the position was articulated 
Adams v Cape Industries Plc (Adams)179 where in terms of the device of  the corporate 
structure a person in control attempts to evade limitations imposed on his conduct by the 
law.180 This doctrine inevitably was developed to combat the inequities that resulted from 
                                                           
174 A Dbe ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil-Old Metaphor, Modern Practice?’ (2017) 3(1) Journal of Corporate and 
Commercial Law and Practice 1. 
175 E Fox ‘Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies’ (1994) 62 George Washington Law Review Fox 
1154. See United States v Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit 142 Fed 247 (1905)247; 255 as emphasized by Fox, 
where Judge Sanborn laid down the general rule regarding piercing the corporate veil. ‘... If any general rule can 
be laid down... it is that a corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until sufficient 
reason to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify 
wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons.’ 
176 See Pacific v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd (Cape Pacific) 1994 (4) SA 790 (A). 
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the legal fiction of limited liability companies.181 The effect of this principle is to 
ultimately hold the company’s shareholders or directors liable for the debts incurred by 
the company as a result of such members.182 
 
One conclusion that can unambiguously be drawn, is that lifting of the corporate veil is 
a remedy that entails creating accountability and preventing abuse of the corporate 
structure, which may be used to conceal wrongs and be abused to gain a personal 
advantage and benefit from the company.183 Despite this aim, the doctrine has 
unfortunately been labelled as one that is blurred in case law.184 
 
4.2 The difference between lifting and piercing the corporate veil 
It becomes apparent when dealing with disregarding a company’s separate legal personality 
that many terms are used in an attempt to accurately describe this process;185 two such terms 
being ‘lifting’ and ‘piercing’ the corporate veil. The question to be asked is whether there is a 
material difference between the words ‘lifting’ and ‘piercing’ the corporate veil or whether 
these terms are purely synonyms with no real impact on the effect of disregarding corporations’ 
separate legal personality. Thus, can these words be used interchangeably for our purpose 
without each attaching a distinct and separate definition? The distinction between these two 
terms were succinctly described by Slaughton LJ who said:186 
“To pierce the corporate veil is an expression that I would reserve for treating the rights or 
liabilities or activities of a company as the rights or liabilities or activities of its shareholders. 
To lift the corporate veil or look behind it, on the other hand, should mean to have regard to the 
shareholding in a company for some legal purpose”. 
It may be deduced from this paragraph that ‘piercing’ the corporate veil has a consequence and 
result attached to it regarding liabilities of the company being treated as those of the 
shareholders and directors, whereas ‘lifting’ the corporate veil is merely an act establishing the 
distinction between a corporation and those behind it with no real detrimental outcome for the 
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shareholders, but merely being a process of identification and distinction of the juristic and 
natural person.187 The Daimler case is an example of the court lifting the corporate veil to 
determine the residence of the company shareholders, to establish if the company was an alien 
or not.188 
However, as pointed out by Becker, South Africa seems to employ these terms 
interchangeably189 to the extent that it has been held to be synonyms.190 In my view I feel no 
need to deviate from such reasoning as I see no detrimental difference evident in using both 
these words to describe the process of disregarding the corporate veil, not in the South African 
context anyway. The remedy itself is of importance and not the technicality of the words used 
to describe such remedy. This being said my focus will lean more towards the rationale of the 
remedy191, which as reiterated Hannigan, a wrongdoer cannot derive benefits from dishonest 
abuse and misuse of the corporate structure for improper purposes.192 Moreover, establishing 
the instances when the remedy can be called upon, is more important. 
 
4.3 Instances when the court will lift the corporate veil 
The debate surrounding lifting the corporate veil has often been embedded around the instances 
under which the court will lift the corporate veil. No suggestion submitted thus far has been 
viable enough to create certainty revolving this issue. One understanding that was clearly 
present in terms of common law was that the law was not settled on this matter and that the 
instances in which a court could pierce the corporate veil involved an enquiry into the facts of 
each case which was to be regarded as decisive importance.193 Cassim further recognises that 
the grounds for lifting the corporate veil have been difficult to state with certainty, owing to 
the fact that the courts have grappled with the correct approach in their determination of 
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whether to lift the corporate veil or not.194 In addition, there was no general discretion bestowed 
on a court to simply lift the corporate veil whenever it was just to do so.195 The lack of 
formulation of such instances is said to be a result of a court choosing to rely on accepted 
categories such as fraud, agency, evasion of legal obligations and abuse of the corporate 
form.196 
 
4.3.1 The common law position regarding lifting the corporate veil 
The common law position pertaining to lifting of the corporate veil, is mainly articulated in 
case law with many cases advancing different instances as to when a court can lift the corporate 
veil. In terms of the prerequisites required before the corporate veil will be pierced in common 
law, there existed two necessary but not sufficient conditions.197 First, that veil piercing is an 
exceptional procedure and special or exceptional conditions must exist preceding lifting the 
corporate veil; and second, the members of the company must possess complete ownership and 
control of the company as well as control finances, policies and practices of the company that 
will allow no separate mind, will or existence of its own.198 A shared reality between the United 
States, England and South Africa was that there was no single, coherent principle which 
justified courts to disregard the separate legal personality of a company.199 It therefore become 
apparent as seen by Rogers AJA, that there was no common unifying principle which justified 
the courts disregarding the corporate veil and moreover, no such principled approach could be 
adduced from the authorities.200  
 
Our courts have instead chosen to rely on various unrelated categories to justify their 
decisions.201 Domanski in an attempt to describe the position, supported Gower’s view, which 
states that the reason for the absence of instances rests solely on the court’s refusal to apply the 
logic and principle put forward in Salomon’s decision where it is blatantly opposed to justice, 
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convenience or the interests of justice.202 The approach followed in terms of common law was 
often coupled with the courts lack of effort to define the precise circumstances under which the 
corporate veil will be lifted. A clear example is provided by Corbett CJ where he said:203 
“I do not find it necessary to consider, or attempt to define, the circumstances under which the 
court will pierce the corporate veil. Suffice it to say that they would generally have to include 
an element of fraud or other improper conduct in the establishment or use of the company or 
the conduct of its affairs. In this connection the words 'device', 'stratagem' 'cloak' and 'sham' 
have been used…” 
 
The above paragraph is problematic to the extent that the court indirectly suggests instances as 
to when it will be likely that the corporate veil will be lifted by mentioning the words ‘would 
generally have to include’ which proposes that certain acts have to be present before the remedy 
can be relied upon. It can hardly be denied that the court was prone to lifting the corporate veil 
when the presence of fraud or other improper conduct was detected, which ultimately draws 
the conclusion that certain guidelines can possibly be extracted from case law. The first step is 
to set out cases commonly referred to when lifting the corporate veil in terms of common law, 
to establish such said instances as to when the corporate veil will be disregarded. 
 
Our courts have avoided a categorising approach.204 As mentioned by Cassim this approach is 
plausible as categorisation would lead to uncertainties in our law, moreover justice or equity 
may require disregarding the separate legal personality and due to the particular instance not 
conforming to a certain category, the court may refuse to do so which could lead to undesirable 
results.205 The danger of categorising was illustrated by Domanski who stated: 
 
“…a situation may arise in which considerations of fairness or public policy would call for a 
decision to pierce the veil, but the court on the facts, is unable to allocate the case to an 
established pigeonhole”.206 
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In the Shipping Corporation case 207 Corbett said that it is not necessary to define the instances 
under which the court will pierce the corporate veil, generally there would need to include an 
element of fraud or improper conduct in the establishment or use of the company or the conduct 
of its affairs.208 This became quite a popular response by the courts as asserted in Cape Pacific 
that it is neither essential nor advisable to formulate general principles as to when the corporate 
veil will be lifted, but rather to apply the appropriate  legal principles to the facts of the present 
matter.209 The courts accordingly showed content in the lack of consistency in the common law 
approach.  
 
As pointed out in the case of Adams210 the courts will pierce the veil in instances when 
corporate personality is used as a means or a device to conceal wrong doing or to avoid 
obligations. In Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne211 the defendant attempted to evade his 
contractual obligations by forming a company to compete with his former employer to gain its 
customers and the court found that the company was a façade and sham which operated to 
engage in business that it knew was not prohibited by the plaintiffs.212 
 
Further in the case of Hulse213 the court said that one needs to look at the facts of each case, 
policy and judicial judgement; moreover, a prerequisite to piercing the corporate veil would 
need to entail some abuse or misuse between the corporate identity and those who control it 
which results in an unfair advantage being afforded to the latter.214 This case also acknowledges 
that some prerequisite should exist, which correlates with cases addressed above that certain 
acts constitute abuse of legal personality.  
 
In addition, the Cape Pacific215 case held that instances of fraud, dishonesty and improper 
conduct could be grounds for piercing the corporate veil.216 In the case of Amlin,217 the court 
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echoed the attitude in preceding cases by acknowledging the general criteria that is relied upon 
in determining whether to lift the corporate veil or not is the existence fraud, agency, evasion, 
abuse of corporate form and where the company is a mere façade concealing the real state of 
affairs.218 
 
A general observation from these cases is that an element of fraud,219 dishonesty or improper 
conduct could be a determining factor as to when a court would disregard the corporate 
personality of a company in terms of common law.220 Drawing from this determination, a 
pattern can be formed which could inform when a court will be inclined to lift the corporate 
veil. What then follows is that if closely examined a cohesive and comprehensive yet not 
restrictive set of guidelines can be formulated to make the process of implementing such 
remedy, more uniform. 
 
4.3.2 The statutory position regarding lifting the corporate veil in terms of s20 (9) of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 
The 2008 Act has brought with it many long-awaited changes, one such being the statutory 
remedy of lifting the corporate veil which is laid down in s20 (9). The current approach to this 
remedy is that it should not ‘be regarded as exceptional, drastic and one of last resort’.221 This 
interpretation is contrary to the common law approach.222 To understand this change requires 
dissecting s20(9), which provides the following: 
 
“If, on application by an interested person or in any proceedings in which a company is 
involved, a court finds that the incorporation of the company, any use of the company, or any 
act by or on behalf of the company, constitutes an unconscionable abuse of the juristic 
personality of the company as a separate entity, the court may –  
(a) declare that the company is to be deemed not to be a juristic person in respect of any right, 
obligation or liability of the company or of a shareholder of the company or, in the case of a 
non-profit company, a member of the company, or of another person specified in the 
declaration; and  
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(b) make any further order the court considers appropriate to give effect to a declaration 
contemplated in paragraph (a)”.223 
 
The 2008 Act can be contrasted to the 1973 Act,224  where the latter did not provide the courts 
with direct discretion to lift the corporate veil,225 clearly showing development on the part of 
the legislature. Section 20(9) has definitely reflected progress and although it is to be 
welcomed, it has not been without its challenges.226 What is required in terms of s20(9) is that 
there must be an ‘…unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of the company as a 
separate entity…’ for this remedy to find application. No guidance has been given as to the 
facts and circumstances that would constitute ‘unconscionable abuse’.227 A commonly used 
method is to compare a section that comes very close and is very similar to but is not the same 
as s20(9),228 which is s65 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984( herein after the ‘1984 
Act’)229 The salient and comparable term to be analysed in s65 is ‘gross abuse’ which could 
aid in ascribing a meaning to the words ‘unconscionable abuse’. A case fundamental to this 
determination is the case of Ex Parte Gore230 which was the first case to deal with s20(9) and 
where the court established that ‘unconscionable abuse’ is something less extreme than ‘gross 
abuse’ owing to the express availability of the remedy when the facts of the case justify it.231  
 
An appropriate meaning can be attached to ‘unconscionable abuse’ by looking at the difference 
and similarities between ‘unconscionable abuse’ and ‘gross abuse’. A case dealing with the 
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phrase ‘gross abuse’ is the case of Ebrahim v Airport Cold Storage Pty Ltd (Airport Cold 
Storage) 232 where s65 of the 1984 Act was used to find the defendants personally liable as a 
result of the use and formation of the close corporation amounting to a ‘gross abuse’ of the 
separate legal personality of the close corporation, for which the defendants had scant regard.233 
The court stated that special circumstances had to exist before the court could disregard the 
corporate veil.234  
 
A similarity between the two terms is that ‘gross abuse’ like ‘unconscionable abuse’ has no 
definition, but what the court in the present case went on to explain is that the principles and 
categories developed in relation to piercing the corporate veil in the context of company law 
also serves as useful guidelines in this context.235 Consequently in terms of the 1984 Act, there 
has been no attempt to indicate guidelines that would aid in assisting the courts as to what 
would constitute an abuse of the juristic person of the corporation, the intention being that the 
court is free to determine on the facts of each case whether such abuse is present or not.236 It is 
however suggested that the ‘gross abuse’ which is relevant relates to the rights, obligations and 
liabilities whether it is that of the corporation, members or others.237 
 
The court in Airport Cold Storage went further to state that what would constitute ‘gross abuse’ 
included; if the close corporation or company was a mere façade concealing the true facts, the 
controlling shareholders do not treat the company as a separate entity but instead treat it as their 
‘alter-ego’ for their own personal and corporate interests; moreover fraud could also qualify as 
a special instance but is not to be regarded as essential.238  It is also important to take cognisance 
of the fact that the court emphasized that it will not lightly disregard a corporations separate 
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legal personality, nor will it readily find such recklessness.239 It may therefore be submitted 
that this description supports the notion that ‘gross abuse’ entails a higher standard of abuse as 
compared to ‘unconscionable abuse’ which the court does not easily find and further, the 
presence of similarity that almost mirrors the common law approach.240 
 
 In Haygro Catering BK v Van der Merwe en andere241  members of a close corporation were 
held personally liable due to the failure of the corporation to state its name on the premises or 
any written orders, further there was no sign that the business was a close corporation because 
no abbreviation stating ‘CC’ appeared.242 Van Niekerk held that a wide discretion was given 
to the court in this provision and that a just interpretation of s65 accords with the protection the 
Act affords to the public.243 For these reasons, the approach adopted in terms of the 1984 Act, 
makes it apparent that the remedy set out in s 20(9) warrants more lenient application, making 
‘unconscionable abuse’ a lower standard of abuse needed to invoke the said remedy. 
 
In Ex Parte Gore244 the court went further to emphasise that ‘unconscionable abuse’ suggests 
conduct in relation to the formation and use of companies which is wide enough to cover all 
descriptive terms such as ‘sham’, ‘device’, ‘stratagem’ and the like employed in earlier cases 
and much more,245 which closely correlates with the common law instances; and further 
whenever the illegitimate use of the concept of separate legal  personality is used which 
adversely affects a third party in a way that it should reasonably not be tolerated.246 However, 
the involvement of fraud or other improper conduct has generally been present in cases which 
the court will pierce the corporate veil, notwithstanding that there is an established stance 
against categorisation.247 
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Another category to be adduced from the Ex Parte Gore case is that of ‘group enterprises’ 
being a factor that the court will consider when deciding to pierce the corporate veil.248 The 
illustration was clearly provided by Ramsay and Noakes who stated that: 
 
    “…  [there are] circumstances [where] a corporate group is operating in such a manner as to make each 
individual entity indistinguishable, and therefore it is proper to pierce the corporate veil to treat the 
parent company as liable for the acts of the subsidiary”.249 
 
What creates uneasiness is the lack of meaning attached to the words ‘unconscionable abuse’ 
and the absence of guidelines or instances as to when a court will be permitted to lift the 
corporate veil. What the determination of ‘unconscionable abuse’ indicates is that judges need 
to make a value judgement.250 As seen above there are a host of instances that have been the 
product of case law, which is to be depended upon when making a determination as to when 
the corporate veil will be disregarded.  
 
One would be led to think that s 20(9) would have created certainty and reflected more guidance 
on when and how the remedy should be applied and implemented. However, the courts still, 
notwithstanding the statutory inclusion of the remedy, have to scramble through case law in an 
attempt to source out circumstances under which to lift the corporate veil. This is a view 
expressly supported by the court stating that s 20(9) is supplemental, rather than substitutive of 
common law.251  
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CHAPTER 5 
DEVELOPMENTS IN CASE LAW 
5.1 The common law  
What was often noticeable in terms of the common law was that the corporate veil was to be 
respected and not readily interfered with, consequently, general discretion did not exist, and 
exceptional factual circumstances needed to be present.252 Common law exceptions to the 
principle of separate legal personality are described as been formulated on grounds of general 
reasons,253 with the primary aim of achieving justice in cases before them rather than 
developing a coherent doctrine as to when legal personality could be disregarded.254 
 
In the case of Hulse255 the court took a strict approach. It involved a situation whereby the third 
appellant was a company in which the two appellants were shareholders.256 The respondent 
ceded his claim in the insolvent estate and was to be paid a sum of money by the company. 
When the money was not paid it was alleged that this was a fraudulent act of collusion on the 
part of the appellants, to receive a breathing period during insolvency and the respondent 
sought to hold the appellants personally liable. The court remarked that it should not delve into 
the merits of the case or examine probabilities of lifting the corporate veil as it could have 
serious consequences for the owner and thus this remedy is to be applied with caution.257 Such 
consequences, include, looking at the controllers interests in the company to meet personal 
obligations or imposing personal liability.258 The court affirmed that separate legal personality 
is to be recognised and adhered to except in the most compelling circumstances.259 Hulse 
showed support for Cape Pacific by recognising that there is no general discretion to disregard 
the separate legal personality on the basis that it is just and convenient to do so.260  
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 The court found that the respondent was not unfairly prejudiced by the distinction of the 
company and those who control it.261 There was no abuse or advantage, and the respondent 
merely sought to ignore the party with whom he contracted to enforce his rights against a more 
convenient defendant.262 
The case of Amlin,263 echoed the strict application of corporate personality displayed in Hulse. 
The issue, was whether an amount paid by the appellant to the respondent was a loan or whether 
it sufficed as a discharge of debt owed to the latter.264 The appellant argued that the holding 
company owed this money and that they were both distinct legal personalities, however the 
contrary was found as the same person was found to be in control of both companies.265 Amlin 
looked at the drastic nature of the remedy. The court said this remedy is to be used sparingly 
and as one of last resort, not to be used as an alternative remedy which gives the applicant an 
election, accordingly there is no general discretion conferred on the court to invoke this 
remedy.266 By the court expressly saying the ‘guiding principle’ is that this remedy is to be 
used in exceptional circumstances,267 is useful as it can be adduced that the common law was 
not all that undirected and unprincipled in its application of the remedy. But just what 
constituted those exceptional circumstances, stumps most academics and scholars. 
The case of Adams268 involved the defendants, two United Kingdom (UK) companies owned 
by South African companies, which mined asbestos and a United States (US) company though 
which the asbestos was marketed in the US.269 The plaintiffs brought an action against the 
defendants for damages due to injury caused by the asbestos. It was found that the subsidiary 
and independent company was a façade to enable the defendants to continue selling asbestos 
in the US.270 The court however found, that there was nothing illegal in the defendants using 
their corporate structure to limit future liability to third parties, which would fall on another 
member of the group instead on the defendants and as a result did not lift the corporate veil. 
The court recognised the principle laid down in Salomon, which our courts will not easily 
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depart from, simply because justice requires it.271 As put forward in this case, our law 
acknowledges the creation of subsidiary companies for better or for worse. 272 This decision 
was however criticised by Lord Keith, who with reference to the case of DHN Food 
Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough273 emphasized his doubts as to whether the 
appeal court had properly applied the exception to the principle of lifting the corporate veil 
which in appropriate circumstances, such as the presence of special circumstances which 
indicate a mere façade concealing true facts.274 Therefore, exceptional circumstances were 
present and the court failed to take steps to implement the remedy. 
In Botha v Van Niekerk(Botha)275 involved a contract of sale which described Van Niekerk or 
nominee as the purchaser.276 Accordingly, upon failure to furnish the guarantee it was argued 
that the second respondent replaced the first respondent and a contract was formed.277 It was 
argued that the second respondent was the first respondent in another guise and the court ought 
to lift the corporate veil, but the application was dismissed.278 Botha formulated the 
unconscionable injustice test.279 This test entails a two stage process as pointed out by Becker, 
the first being to determine if the conduct of those using the company’s juristic personality was 
improper or not; and the second being if the conduct was improper, did the prejudiced party 
suffer an unconscionable injustice.280 This test was not favoured in Cape Pacific and was 
described as too rigid to which the court felt that a more flexible approach is needed, one that 
allows the facts of the case to be a determining factor.281 The courts failure to give guidelines 
as to what would constitute ‘improper conduct’ was certainly a shortcoming, as the court could 
have created a multi- factor approach to determine ‘improper conduct’.282 Similarly, in 
Lategan283 the court introduced a prerequisite by stating that courts would ignore the corporate 
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veil where fraudulent use is made of corporate personality.284 This reasoning was adopted 
following the approach of the Canadian courts, where fraud had to be present before the 
corporate veil could be lifted; the court accordingly imported that rationale into our law, save 
where statute provides otherwise.285 It has however been submitted that the tests in Lategan 
and Botha are obiter and South African courts are at liberty to consider alternative approaches 
when lifting the corporate veil.286 
In Cape Pacific, the third respondent, Lubner conducted his business through a consortium of 
companies, collectively known as ‘the Lubner group’. Various companies were owned by ‘the 
children’s trusts’ of which Lubner was a trustee.287 The first respondent who was Lubner 
Controlling Investments (LCI) was at all material times owned by children’s trust through 
Wencor and Gerald Lubner Family Trust, the latter owned all the shares in LCI.288 Lubner was 
never a shareholder or director of either of these companies, Swersky was at all material times 
the sole director.289 In 1979, Lubner owned all issued shares of GLI. In 1985 the Gerald Lubner 
Trust acquired a minority shareholding in GLI.290 LCI was also the owner of certain Findon 
shares which allowed Lubner to occupy a flat in Cape Town. Subsequently, in 1976 Lubner 
became a resident overseas. In 1979 Swersky with the assistance of an estate agent sold the 
Findon shares to the appellant. Lubner with the knowledge of the appellants’ rights and in fraud 
of those rights, did not transfer the shares to the appellant to enable him to continue occupying 
the flat in Cape Town.291 The court with regard to all the relevant circumstances, to disregard 
the separate corporate personalities of LCI and GLI in order to give effect to the action for 
delivery of the Findon shares to the appellant i.e. lift the corporate veil. Ownership was found 
to be of convenience, as LCI was never debited with expenses for the flat, thereby showing no 
substance.292 The court accordingly found that; Lubner exercised complete control of LCI and 
regarded the Cape Town flat as one of his homes,293 Lubner exercised effective control over 
the affairs of GLI at the relevant time by exercising complete voting control he had in relation 
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to GLI and all matters relating to Findon were in fact transferred to Lubner..294 Therefore, the 
transfer of shares equated to the evasion of obligations i.e. the appellants claim/ rights as put 
forward as more appropriate in this case.295  
What is significant in Cape Pacific is the law set out as reflecting the current position of 
common law. Our starting point in the present case refers to the courts approval to lift the 
corporate veil. The court recognises the sanctity of the principle of separate legal personality, 
but of equal importance is that in certain circumstances the court will be justified to disregard 
the separate legal personality of a company.296 This view is supported by Cilliers who remarks 
that ‘[i]n certain instances the courts are prepared to peer through the veil’.297 The court 
however contradicts itself by saying that the law is not resolved regarding the circumstances 
that would permit courts to lift the corporate veil.298 What the court does hold firm is that there 
is no general discretion to disregard the separate legal personality whenever it is just to do so.299 
Separate legal personality is a ‘salutary principle’, not to be lightly disregarded, and requires 
the court to give effect to it so as to avoid undermining policy and principles that underlie it.300 
The court emphasized that the facts of the case may function as a decisive factor, moreover, 
the remedy must be legally appropriate in the circumstances.301 In addition, the court will be 
inclined to look at the substance rather than the form of things.302 This logic is in line with the 
common law principles that if a factual enquiry reveals that the acts of the company are actually 
the acts of those who control the company, liability will be imposed on those individuals.303 
Fraudulent or improper conduct may reveal that the company is merely the alter ego of those 
who control it.304 However, ‘[t]he need to preserve the separate corporate identity would in 
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such circumstances have to be balanced against policy considerations which arise in favour of 
piercing the corporate veil.’305 To this end the court found that:  
‘It is not necessary that a company should have been conceived and founded in deceit, and 
never have been intended to function genuinely as a company, before its corporate personality 
can be disregarded…’306 
Moreover, the court recognised that: 
‘… if a company, otherwise legitimately established and operated, is misused in a particular 
instance to perpetrate a fraud, or for a dishonest or improper purpose, there is no reason in 
principle or logic why its separate personality cannot be disregarded in relation to the 
transaction in question…’307 
The court found that the remedy of lifting the corporate veil should not be precluded due the 
existence of an alternative remedy, as such failure to pursue the alternative remedy does not 
prevent a court from granting the relief of disregarding the separate legal personality of a 
company.308 The existence of an alternative remedy is merely a factor that will be considered 
relating to policy considerations but will not be regarded as decisive importance.309 
The common law often underlined the attitude to keep intact the sanctity of separate legal 
personality, and to only deviate in limited circumstances, with the courts possessing no 
discretionary powers to do so when they deemed it just. The courts as seen in chapter 4 and 5 
cumulatively often lifted the veil when fraud, improper conduct or dishonesty arose. Cape 
Pacific introduced a very commendable attitude, whilst upholding the principle laid down in 
Salomon, it acknowledges that the facts should be the ultimate determining factor. As explained 
by Smith, common law created a ‘flexible and self-contained remedy’ which allowed the 
outcome of the case to be based on the merits of the case.310 
There are situations where it could result in companies and controllers outright abuse in their 
corporate entity, if the courts refuse to look behind it and attach liability where it truly lies. 
Thus, the rationale of disregarding the corporate entity is to essentially prevent injustice, what 
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this entails is looking into the merits of the case and does not require the presence of every 
factor.311 
5.2 Statutory law: The current position 
Prior to the enactment of s20(9), our law reflected a formal approach which was restricted in 
its application; Australia, England and SA were all recipients to this formalism.312The case to 
first apply this section was Ex Parte Gore.313 The facts giving rise to this case involved three 
king brothers who managed the overall holding company which was king financial holdings 
Ltd (KFH) which together with the other subsidiary companies in the group was in liquidation. 
The brothers were the directors of KFH and most of its subsidiaries and at all material times 
held majority shares and were in control of the group. 314 The companies were conducted with 
no regard to the separate legal personality between the holding company and the subsidiary 
companies. 315 
 
What this section provides as discussed above, is that the conduct in question must amount to 
‘unconscionable abuse’ before the corporate veil may be lifted. The meaning and scope of this 
term has been vested entirely in the courts discretion.316 This term however, should be 
distinguished from ‘unconscionable injustice’ as developed in the Botha case above; the former 
relates to the act that triggers the implementation of the remedy and the latter describes the 
consequences suffered by the plaintiff in question.317  
 
The court indicated that s 20(9) is cast in very wide terms and affords a firm and very flexible 
basis for the remedy and detracts from the notion that it is a drastic and exceptional remedy 
that is to be approached with caution.318 The flexibility of this provision is expressly provided 
for, which allows a court on its own accord to pierce the corporate veil, absent the applicants 
request to do so.319 This directly confers upon the court discretionary powers regarding 
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invoking the remedy, which was not present in the common law.320 South African authorities 
have shown that there is no general discretion to lift the veil because it would be just and 
equitable, however courts will lift the corporate veil where justice requires it and not only where 
there is no alternative remedy.321 Essentially the basis to grant relief has been expanded, with 
the intention of the legislature being to apply this provision to varying factual circumstances.322  
 
The determination ultimately involves a policy-based enquiry; weighing the sanctity of legal 
personality and material practical and legal considerations underlying the legal fiction against 
the moral and economic effects of imposing liability on members of a company.323 This is 
consistent with the common law approach.324 Moreover, no alternative remedy needs to be 
present.325 It was accordingly held that investors funds were used in an inconsistent manner, 
which was to pay off debts, than what had been represented, which amounted to an 
unconscionable abuse as a result this led to the company being wound up.326 All investors were 
entitled to the residual assets as the relief sought and the company was deemed not to be a 
juristic person.327 
 
Section 20(9) is said to lie between the middle and maximalist approach for two reasons; first, 
the terms of this provision are wide and the operation depends on the courts finding of 
unconscionability and not on fraud or deception; secondly, this provision accords with the 
principle that where a person has more than one remedy, the law permits him to choose which 
to pursue and not make an election for him.328 Further, there is greater flexibility regarding the 
remedies possible in terms of s20(9) in comparison to the judicial doctrine of veil piercing i.e. 
different remedies for different creditors or there could be an order of subordination of 
particular debts.329  
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But just how receptive have the courts been towards s 20(9) given that the scope and application 
of the remedy has been broadened coupled with the discretionary powers of the court. In Van 
Zyl v Kaye330 the applicants invoked s 20(9) to ask the court to lift the corporate veil of the 
trust.331 The trust was a family trust that was founded for acquiring and holding property, 
however, Kaye one of the beneficiaries of the trust used the properties as his personal assets 
and the applicants contended that the trust was an alter-ego of Kaye.332 The court however, 
came to the conclusion that no unconscionable abuse has taken place even if property was used 
to secure obligations of other companies.333 Binns J in relation to ‘unconscionability’ 
emphasized that the remedy of ‘piercing its veneer’ s described in this case, represents an 
equitable remedy to the affected third party and is afforded in suitable or appropriate cases.334 
Essentially, it lends itself to a flexible approach to fairly and justly address the consequences 
of an unconscionable abuse in the given circumstances.335 It is a remedy that is generally used 
when the [corporate] form is used in dishonest or unconscionable manner to evade liability or 
avoid an obligation.336  
 
Thus, the advantage of statutory provisions is that it gives more certainty and visibility.337 The 
danger however, is that it may result in rigidity if applied in a highly technical manner.338 
 
5.3 Foreign case law 
When interpreting our current law, the court in Ex Parte Gore stated that the 2008 Act must be 
interpreted and applied in a manner that gives effect to s7.339 Section 5(2) of the 2008 Act 
allows foreign law to be considered, which is relevant to this discussion as the court in Ex Parte 
Gore relied on foreign jurisdictions to reach its decision.340 This is particularly important as 
cases relied upon are deemed to reflect our current position and will enable a viable conclusion 
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to be drawn regarding the development of the remedy and  what can be amended to bring it in 
line with what our courts need. 
 
It was aptly described by the New Zealand court that: 
‘…to lift the corporate veil…is not a principle. It describes the process but provides no 
guidance as to when it can be used.’341 
In Australian jurisdiction, the courts had a tendency to take a facts-based approach to the issue 
of piercing the corporate veil and the difficulties were said to be attributed to; the factual nature 
of issues on piercing the corporate veil and the courts wanting to reserve the discretionary 
powers for themselves.342 In the case of AGC (Investments) Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation 
(Cth)343 the court acknowledged that the circumstances in which the veil may be lifted is indeed 
circumscribed.344 A rigid approach was criticised for preferring substance over form.345 In 
Gorton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation346 it was concluded that this approach led the law 
into ‘unreality and formalism’347 There has been  an improvement in Australian law, where the 
courts now recognise discrete factors which are grouped into categories such as agency, fraud, 
sham or façade, group enterprises and justice, which is not an exhaustive list.348  
In the English decision of Ben Hashem v Al Shayif349 the marriage broke down and the wife 
sought relief from her husband.350 A dispute arose as to the true ownership of the companies 
and properties, resulting in the wife asking the court to lift the corporate veil contending that 
the company was the alter ego of the husband and the shareholders were his nominees as they 
                                                           
341 See Attorney-General v Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd [1996] 1 NZLR 528. See also R Cassim ‘Piercing 
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344 See AGC (Investments) Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (Unreported case, Federal Court, Hill J, 22 
February 1991) 44. 
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349 See Ben Hashem v Al Shayif and Another [2008] EWHC 2380 (Fam) ([2009] 1 FLR 115; [2008] Fam Law 
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350 See Ben Hashem v Al Shayif and Another [2008] EWHC 2380 (Fam) ([2009] 1 FLR 115; [2008] Fam Law 
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did not purchase the shares in the company.351 A valuable part of the court’s judgement was 
the formulation of principles to guide the implementation of lifting the corporate veil. The court 
recognised the circumstances that needed to precede the decision to lift the corporate veil.352 
The following principles were then advanced: 
1. Ownership and control of a company are not of themselves sufficient to justify piercing the 
veil.353 
2. The court cannot pierce the corporate veil, even where there is no unconnected third party 
involved, merely because it is thought to be necessary in the interests of justice.354 
3. The corporate veil can be pierced only if there is some ‘impropriety’.355 
4. The court cannot pierce the corporate veil merely because the company is involved in some 
impropriety; such impropriety must be linked to the use of the company structure to avoid or 
conceal liability.356 
5. If the court is to pierce the veil it is necessary to show both control of the company by the 
wrongdoers and impropriety, that is, misuse of the company by them as a device or façade to 
conceal their wrongdoing.357 
6. A company can be a façade even though it was not originally incorporated with any deceptive 
intent. The question is whether it is being used as a façade at the time of the relevant 
transactions358 
Ben Hashem  is important as in Ex Parte Gore the court makes mention that this case is now 
the current position in our law except to the extent that 'the court will pierce the veil only so 
                                                           
351 Ben Hashem supra note 17 See Ben Hashem v Al Shayif and Another [2008] EWHC 2380 (Fam) ([2009] 1 
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353 See Ben Hashem v Al Shayif and Another [2008] EWHC 2380 (Fam) ([2009] 1 FLR 115; [2008] Fam Law 
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354 See Ben Hashem v Al Shayif and Another [2008] EWHC 2380 (Fam) ([2009] 1 FLR 115; [2008] Fam Law 
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355 See Ben Hashem v Al Shayif and Another [2008] EWHC 2380 (Fam) ([2009] 1 FLR 115; [2008] Fam Law 
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356 See Ben Hashem v Al Shayif and Another [2008] EWHC 2380 (Fam) ([2009] 1 FLR 115; [2008] Fam Law 
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357 See Ben Hashem v Al Shayif and Another [2008] EWHC 2380 (Fam) ([2009] 1 FLR 115; [2008] Fam Law 
1179) at par 163. 
358 See Ben Hashem v Al Shayif and Another [2008] EWHC 2380 (Fam) ([2009] 1 FLR 115; [2008] Fam Law 
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far as is necessary to provide a remedy for the particular wrong which those controlling the 
company have done', is incorrect.359 This formulation is of great assistance in visually putting 
forward guidelines as to what implementing the remedy entails and just what our current law 
should reflect. 
In another English decision, in the case of VTB 360 the issue of piercing the corporate veil arose 
as a secondary issue.361 The court stated that the unprincipled approach was supported by the 
fact that the nature, basis and meaning of the principle are somewhat obscure and so are the 
circumstances justifying the court to lift the corporate veil.362However, it is right for the law to 
pierce the corporate veil in certain circumstances in order to combat injustice.363 It is open to 
the court in the jurisdiction to pierce the corporate veil.364 The façade may often be regarded 
as the cornerstone in cases.365 The court found it unnecessary to  decide whether without the 
express or implied authority of statute, the court could pierce the corporate veil.366 The 
Supreme Court of Appeal has been described as putting ‘a cautious toe in the water’.367 This 
could possibly lead us to conclude that s20(9) provides an indisputable basis to lift the corporate 
veil.  
In  Prest v Petrodel368 the question before the court was whether the court could give company 
assets to the wife without the necessary abuse taking place.369 The court recognised that there 
are circumstances that warrant the corporate veil to be lifted, as such limited power to pierce 
the veil in defined circumstances will prevent abuse.370 The court found that the problem lies 
in, exactly what constitutes wrong doing because the terms ‘façade’ and ‘sham’ raise more 
uncertainty.371 The court advanced the concealment and evasion principle; the former does not 
involve imposing liability but rather to discover the facts being hidden by the corporate 
structure and the latter allows the court to pierce the corporate veil when they have a legal right 
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against the person who controls the company.372 This negates the position, that the terms lifting 
and piercing the corporate veil are pure synonyms.373 The court found that if a person is under 
a legal obligation, liability or subject to a restriction and deliberately evades or whose 
enforcement he frustrates by disrupting a company under his control; the court may pierce the 
corporate veil for the purpose only to deprive the controller of an advantage he would normally 
receive.374 In agreement with Ben Hashem if it is unnecessary to pierce the corporate veil, it is 
not appropriate to do so, hence public policy does not justify it, which is consistent with the 
long standing principles of legal policy.375 There was no evidence that the husband was seeking 
to avoid any obligations.376 
The court disagreed with VTB and said that you can pierce the corporate veil when all more 
conventional remedies have proved to be of no assistance.377 It is done usually in the case of 
evasion rather than concealment, an exception in addition to the evasion principle will be hard 
to establish.378 Only true exceptions to the Salomon case warrant piercing the corporate veil 
i.e. where a person who owns and controls a company is said in certain circumstances to be 
identified with it in law by virtue of that ownership and control.379 Bull submits that other 
circumstances where a legal rule may attach acts or assets of a corporation to its controller may 
have the effect of creating personal liability or beneficial ownership in the controller, but these 
are not regarded as veil-piercing in the true and strict sense.380 
The decision in Prest v Petrodel has been criticised in comparison to Ben Hashem.381 In Ben 
Hashem the court looks at necessity rather than a remedy of last resort. 382 As such, the test for 
necessity does not require the remedy to be one of last resort, the latter demands more stringent 
requirements than necessity.383 Ben Hashem solely concerned establishing the principles that 
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would give rise to grounds that enabled the court to pierce the corporate veil.384 Whilst Prest v 
Petrodel recognised the lack of a coherent principle when applying the doctrine and has been 
applauded for limiting piercing the corporate veil to cases of evasion, which should be 
approached with caution.385 Dbe advances that Prest v Petrodel was a minimalist approach, as 
the court restricted veil piercing by submitting that it always involves or almost always involves 
the evasion of an existing legal obligation, however it left open the question as to whether this 
was an exhaustive statement of law.386 Despite this, Lord Mance has been quite realistic by 
acknowledging that disregarding the corporate veil must be a tailored remedy, fitted to the 
circumstances giving rise to it.387 However, the court rejected categories warranting piercing 
the corporate veil due to the danger that it may fail to accommodate future situations.388 
Foreign law is useful in our current determination due to the progress the courts have made. 
This encourages our courts and legislature to develop and create certainty regarding what 
triggers this remedy. The hesitation of our courts in dealing with the circumstances giving rise 
to this remedy is clearly present in most cases, however foreign law, is certainly a step closer 
towards development and unambiguity. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 Conclusion 
At the time of incorporation, the company is recognised as having separate legal existence from 
its members and directors, known as separate legal personality.389  However, given the nature 
of a company, specifically that it has only legal and not physical existence, the acts and rights 
bestowed on a company is essentially carried out by designated representatives.390 
As created by Salomon this principle is the cornerstone of company law and is to be relaxed in 
very few circumstances.391 The common law followed an approach of sheer reluctance and 
hesitation, given that the consequences could be extreme.392 But, as seen, adopting a rigid 
approach poses a threat to the commercial world. Even though it upholds a long-standing 
principle, it does so at the expense of policy considerations which prohibit such acts. 
The need for the remedy of lifting the corporate veil has proved to be one that is required to 
rectify wrongs and abuse.393 What became apparent was the lack of formulation of guidelines 
in the implementation of the remedy.394 Notwithstanding this, categorisation has been 
submitted to be an undesired route due to injustice that could result in the absence of an 
available category in relation to a particular set of facts.395 
The 2008 Act providing a statutory basis for lifting the corporate veil is undeniably a 
development, and although it has been a move towards change, it is not as complete and final 
in the certainty it brings or the aim it seeks to achieve. The flexibility and discretion of this 
provision is a step towards combatting abuse of the corporate structure, however if not properly 
assisted it could result in the floodgates of this remedy being opened and the sanctity of the 
Salomon principle being lost. On the flip side, if the Salomon principle is rigidly upheld 
companies will succumb to their controllers’ mishandling and abusing the company and its 
corporate structure. In order to keep the Salomon principle intact and achieve justice, a balance 
has to be struck as to when the court is permitted to lift the corporate veil. The thesis thus 
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recommends that such balance be achieved through implementing a guidance system of factors 
and principles required to invoke this remedy. 
Foreign law illustrates a move away from strict adherence to the Salomon principle to achieve 
justice.396 However, there still seems to be some reluctance in unnecessary circumstances or 
where evasion of obligations is not present to pierce the corporate veil.397 On the other hand, 
some jurisdictions recognise categories that could be a factor considered when lifting the 
corporate veil, which indicates direction and confidence in how they apply this remedy,398 to 
the extent that certain principles have been advanced to guide this remedy.399 
Between the common law, foreign law and statute there seems to be a few similarities that 
when put together form certain patterns that correlate to what the courts are usually inclined to 
do. The courts have failed to link these general observations due to the lack of effort or in fear 
of destroying the sanctity of the Salomon principle. Section 20(9) itself leaves room for the 
legislature to explain the concept of ‘unconscionable abuse’ and what conduct would constitute 
such abuse. This could be done by remaining flexible and unrestricted but also providing clarity 
as to what the intention of the legislature precisely is. 
 
6.2 Recommendations 
It is recommended that the courts ought to refrain from relying heavily on case law that has 
preceded the cases before in an attempt to unpack and apply relevant principles but should 
rather have a set of principles that they can apply their mind to in addition to the discretion they 
have been given. Although every case factually differs, there might be injustice to parties if the 
courts do not follow a consistent approach or the floodgates to invoking the remedy can be 
increased.  
In furtherance of the aim of the thesis, hopefully the courts or the legislature will soon fill this 
gap to encourage certainty and provide a viable solution to this problem. The formulation of 
such guiding principles will essentially function as such solution and bring about the clarity as 
to what conduct can fall within the ambit of this remedy. 
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In the formulation of these guidelines, it would be essential to ensure that they are not 
exhaustive or restrictive, but rather aim to provide a cohesive and uniform approach. Using the 
framework of Ben Hashem and the description of the remedy as a ‘process’ in the case of 
Equiticorp Industries 400 , the guiding process should include the following:  
  
a) Approach and attitude  
This remedy has developed and requires a flexible approach coupled with discretionary powers 
to give effect to the purpose of the remedy and moves away from the conservative and strict 
approach prior to the 2008 Act.401Recognition to the importance of the Salomon principle must 
be given, but cognisance should be taken that certain instances require you to detract from this 
principle.402 Therefore, acknowledging that this is a ‘salutary principle’. 403 
There is no need proceed with caution or analyse alternative remedies prior to lifting the 
corporate veil.404 However, this remedy may be selected on the courts’ own accord in the 
absence of being requested to invoke such remedy.405The basis of granting such relief is 
applicable to varying factual scenarios, hence categorisation should be avoided.406 
 
b)  Factors and considerations 
Complete ownership or control is not a necessary prerequisite to lifting the corporate veil.407 
This is an equitable remedy to be afforded in suitable or appropriate cases.408 Abuse of the 
corporate form in disregarding the distinction between the holding company and its 
subsidiaries, could be a factor.409 Generally, dishonesty, improper conduct and fraud would 
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need to be present.410 A link between the said conduct and use of the corporate structure to 
evade obligations needs also to be present.411 It would also be necessary to establish whether 
the company was used for improper purposes at the time of the transaction, where the company 
need not be founded in such deceit.412 
The intention rather than the form of things is most important, 413 and the facts of the case are 
ultimately a determining factor.414The statutory provision provides a wider basis to lift the 
corporate veil, and the legislature should add to the provision by stating that ‘unconscionable 
abuse’ constitutes but is not restricted to the following: 
• Something less than gross abuse;415 
• A lower standard of abuse, therefore encompassing various types of conduct, including 
terms such as a device, stratagem, sham, and cloak and including an element of fraud 
and improper conduct in the formation and use or conduct of its affairs, but does not 
provide an exhaustive list;416 
• Evading or avoiding legal obligations;417and  
• This is an act and not a consequence.418 
 
c) Balancing and weighing up 
The need to preserve the veil must be balanced against policy considerations relating to 
piercing the corporate veil.419 
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This determination involves a policy-based enquiry which should take into consideration the 
sanctity of the legal fiction and the legal considerations underpinning it, versus the impact and 
of imposing liability on the members.420 
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